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BOOK REVIEWS 
God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism by David 
O'Connor. Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Pp. xiii and 273. $63.00 
(Cloth); 23.95 (Paper). 
MICHAEL BERGMANN, Purdue University 
In this book David O'Connor carefully and fairly argues that both athe-
ists and theists should recognize that each other's views on Cod's exis-
tence can be justified. His focus is inscrutable evil (evil for which we can 
discern no justification). He argues that the atheist's awareness of the 
existence of such evil lends support to her atheism and contributes to the 
justification of that view. Nevertheless, he thinks this same awareness 
on the part of the theist needn't make her theism irrational. 
In explaining how this can be so, O'Connor identifies two frame-
works within which to examine the argument for atheism from the exis-
tence of inscrutable evil. The first is the framework of what he calls 'the 
standard model'. According to this first framework, we are able "to 
compare, in terms of inscrutable evit the condition of the actual world to 
how the world would be if Cod did not exist" and on the basis of such a 
comparison, draw a justified conclusion "as to which of the two sides 
has the stronger evidence and so the better of the argument about the-
ism and inscrutable evil" (229). The second is the framework of what he 
calls 'skeptical theism'. According to it our failure to discern any God-
justifying reason for an evil does not provide evidence for thinking there 
is no God-justifying reason for that evil (185). Now, as I understand 
him, O'Connor suggests (230-31) that the reason both the atheist and 
theist can be justified in their beliefs and yet recognize that the other is 
also justified is this. Given the standard model one is justified in accept-
ing atheism, while given the skeptical theist's framework one is justified 
in accepting theism, or at least inscrutable evil poses no threat to theistic 
belief that is otherwise justified. Unfortunately, there are no decisive con-
siderations that are telling for both atheists and theists in support of 
either the standard model or the skeptical theist's framework. 
Recognition of these two points should, he thinks, lead to the detente he 
recommends. 
The book is divided into two parts. In the first part (chapters 2-8), he 
stays within the standard model. In that context, he proposes what he 
calls 'a reformed logical argument from evil'. His main purpose in pre-
senting this argument is to show that the best currently available 
responses (those by Hasker, Plantinga, Schlesinger, Swinburne and van 
Inwagen) to arguments like his fail to successfully defend theism against 
his reformed logical argument. He then uses this failure as a premise in 
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what he calls Ian indirect empirical argument from evil'. That indirect 
argument goes like this: since theism is a theory that must be defended 
against an argument such as his reformed argument if it is to be justifi-
ably believed and since the best available defenses fail, we have, in the 
context of the standard model, "good reason, if we are either agnostics 
or theists to begin with, to move toward atheism" (178). 
Let's take a closer look at his reformed logical argument from evil. 
O'Connor divides evils into the following three kinds: moral evils, nat-
ural evils resulting from natural processes alone (NERNP) and natural 
evils not resulting from natural processes alone (NE-RNP). NE-RNP 
are evils to which free moral agents have contributed in nonmoral ways 
(e.g., accidentally knocking a cat off a high balcony and thereby terrify-
ing and killing it). His reformed logical argument (10-12) can be out-
lined as follows: 
1. There is seeming NERNP (above some level n).l 
2. Seeming NERNP (above level n) is gratuitous.2 
3. Gratuitous evil is inconsistent with orthodox theism (OT). 
4. Therefore, OT is false. 3 
O'Connor begins his defense of this argument by considering (in chapter 
3) Hasker's and van lnwagen's objections to premise 3. His treatment of 
Hasker is excellent. But since Hasker tries to explain why there is a 
God-justifying reason for permitting gratuitous evil (i.e., evil for the per-
mission of which there is no justifying reason) it isn't too surprising that 
O'Connor is able to identify errors in Hasker's argument. Van Inwagen 
does not attempt to identify a God-justifying reason for the existence of 
gratuitous evil. His point is that chance evil is compatible with the exis-
tence of God (chance evil is evil for which there is no reason at all and, 
hence, no God-justifying reason). But O'Connor takes van Inwagen to 
be conceding that although gratuitous evil and God are compatible, not 
just any amount of gratuitous evil is compatible with the existence of 
God. So O'Connor sidesteps van Inwagen's objection to premise 3 by 
reformulating it (and premise 2) to say: 
2*. Seeming NERNP (above level n) is too much gratuitous or point-
less evil. 
3*. Too much gratuitous or pointless evil is inconsistent with OT. 
With these revisions in place, O'Connor sets out (in chapter 4) to 
defend premise 2*. He first explains what he means by OT. OT is a the-
istic worldview according to which (among other things) God allows 
certain amounts of evil so that he can obtain the following good: 
G: having free creatures that can develop morally and spiritually 
into beings who can freely love and serve God (78). 
Then O'Connor appeals to a point conceded by those who grant the 
plausibility of Plantinga's free will defense (86-88). The point is that 
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there is a possible world in which God is able to obtain G without per-
mitting any genuine NERNP (i.e., a world in which all seeming NERNP 
is caused by Satan and his cohorts). This possibility doesn't show that 
God could have obtained G without permitting any seeming NERNP. 
But once you grant it, it is a short step to granting that it is possible for 
God to have obtained G without creating Satan (or any other free crea-
ture capable of being responsible for all seeming NERNP). This is exactly 
the possibility O'Connor draws to our attention later in the book when 
discussing Plantinga's defense (124-26). Thus, O'Connor relies on the 
above considerations to establish 
P: God could have obtained G without permitting any seeming 
NERNP. 
And from this he infers that 
Q: All seeming NERNP is gratuitous. 
For van Inwagen reasons, he allows that a certain amount of seeming 
NERNP may be consistent with OT. But seeming NERNP above some 
level n is too much gratuitous evil. This conclusion is his premise 2*. 
What should we make of O'Connor's reformed logical argument? 
O'Connor claims to show that the best available defenses (Plantinga's, 
Schlesinger'S and Swinburne's) fail when applied to this argument. But 
even before considering those defenses and O'Connor's reply to them, I 
think we can see that his reformed logical argument is seriously flawed. 
Let's grant him premises 1 and 3*. This still leaves premise 2*. And, 
unfortunately, it is pretty clear that O'Connor's defense of premise 2* 
doesn't work. For notice that in defending premise 2*, O'Connor made 
the inference from P to Q. From the fact that seeming NERNP is not 
necessary for achieving G, he concluded that such evil is gratuitous. But 
what if seeming NERNP is necessary for some other reason? What if the 
divine plan includes the securing of outweighing goods other than G, 
goods that can be secured only by allowing seeming NERNP above level 
n? In saying that the divine plan includes the securing of G, OT is not 
committed to saying that it includes the securing of no other goods. 
O'Connor takes himself to have identified a kind of evil that is incom-
patible with OT. But what he's shown (at best) is that seeming NERNP 
above level n is inconsistent with a version of OT that insists that the 
only reason God would allows such evil is to obtain G. And that is not a 
very widely held version of OT (I know of no one who endorses it). 
In the remainder of part one (chapters 5-7) O'Connor considers how 
the defenses he mentions fare when applied to the reformed logical 
argument. I don't have much to say about his discussion of the 
Swinburne and Schlesinger defenses. What he says there seems emi-
nently sensible. But his discussion of Plantinga in chapter 6 is the weak-
est part of the book. The reader's suspicions that there is trouble ahead 
are roused upon reading O'Connor's account of the property Plantinga 
calls 'transworld depravity'. Like many others, O'Connor seems to seri-
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ously misunderstand what that property is.4 When he formulates it in 
his own words (122) he shows no sensitivity to the fact that counterfac-
tuals are involved. And he says that Plantinga's claim is that it is possi-
ble that transworld depravity is an essential property of every creaturely 
essence with morally significant freedom. But Plantinga explicitly 
insists that he is claiming only that it is possible that it is an accidental 
property of all such essences.s Furthermore, O'Connor takes Plantinga 
to be denyillg Mackie's claim that there is a possible world in which all 
free creatures always freely do what is right. But, again, Plantinga 
explicitly insists that he is granting that possibility." So O'Connor 
appears to have failed to appreciate the intricacies of Plantinga's free 
will defense. Fortunately, the bulk of his discussion of Plantinga does 
not depend on a correct understanding of the details of that defense. 
However, the troubles in chapter 6 do not end there. It is in this chap-
ter that O'Connor argues that there is a world (actualizable by God) that 
has no seeming NERNP and in which God secures the good G. The 
world in question is one in which God obtains G without permitting the 
existence of Satan or any other being capable of causing all seeming 
NERNP (125-26). This shows, says O'Connor, that a Plantinga-style 
defense does not succeed in defending the compatibility of seeming 
NERNP and OT. But a slight modification of Plantinga's free will 
defense (which, as O'Connor acknowledges, must be modified if it is to 
even apply to the reformed logical argument) will do the trick. Suppose 
that the outweighing good that God wants is not merely G but: 
G*: having a sufficient variety of kinds of free creatures that can 
develop morally and spiritually into beings who can freely love 
and serve God. 
And suppose that each creaturely essence with morally significant free-
dom is (contingently) transworld depraved.' Then, assuming that hav-
ing angelic beings of Satan's kind (or other beings capable of causing 
seeming NERNP) is entailed by G*, we can say that O'Connor's 
reformed argument succumbs to a Plantinga-like defense. For, given the 
above suppositions, in order to obtain G* God had to make a transworld 
depraved being capable of being morally responsible for seeming 
NERNP. O'Connor has done nothing to show that this isn't so - that 
God could secure G* without allowing for seeming NERNP. And it is 
no part of OT to deny that G* is one of the goods God wanted to obtain. 
But there is no need for the theist to identify a good like G* in order to 
resist O'Connor's arguments. It is enough for the defender of OT to 
point out, as I did earlier, that O'Connor has done nothing to show that 
every outweighing good that God thinks is worth securing can be 
secured in a world in which he permits no seeming NERNP. But this is 
what O'Connor would have to do if he is interested in attacking the 
most plausible versions of OT (since they don't claim that G is the only 
good that God seeks to obtain by permitting evil). Thus, it looks like the 
two main arguments of part one - the reformed logical argument and 
the indirect empirical argument which relied on its success - fail. And 
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this isn't a problem that can easily be avoided. As far as I can tell, it can 
be avoided only by focusing on versions of OT that claim to give an 
exhaustive list of the outweighing goods that provide God with reasons 
for allowing evil (O'Connor himself seems to focus on a version of OT 
whose purportedly exhaustive list contains only G). But the problem is 
that almost no one endorses such versions of OT.8 
Let's turn now to part two of the book (chapters 9-11). Here he con-
siders the problem of evil within the skeptical theist's framework. 
According to the skeptical theist, our failure to discern a God-justifying 
reason for the evil we observe (e.g. seeming NERNP) provides no com-
pelling reason for thinking there is no God-justifying reason for such evil. 
As I understand the thread of O'Connor's argument in these chapters, 
he first makes an important concession to the skeptical theist. In making 
this concession, he is conceding that theism can be rational even for 
well-informed believers. Then he identifies some considerations that he 
thinks make it reasonable for the atheist to reject the skeptical theist's 
framework and to stick with the framework of the standard model 
instead. Given that these considerations can be rationally compelling for 
the atheist without being rationally compelling for the theist, he arrives 
at his conclusion that both theism and atheism can be justified. I will 
argue that the considerations that, according to O'Connor, support a 
rejection of the skeptical theist's framework do not in fact support such a 
rejection. Given the concession O'Connor makes to the skeptical theist it 
appears that atheists and theists alike have every reason to endorse the 
main ingredients of the skeptical theist's framework (which doesn't 
include theism itself). 
What is the concession that O'Connor makes to the skeptical theist? 
He recognizes our limitations when it comes to discerning the sorts of 
reasons God might have for doing what he does. Thus, he concedes 
(208) that 
R: We have no good reason to expect that if OT were true we 
would be able to discern God-justifying reasons for the evils that 
are permitted.Y 
I think this concession is extremely plausible. I also think it provides 
decisive support for the skeptical theist's framework (though not for the-
ism itself). 
Let's consider the various considerations that O'Connor says count 
against the skeptical theist's framework. First, there is the problem of 
divine silence. It is one thing, says O'Connor (208-9), to acknowledge 
that it is not reasonable to expect to be able to discern God's reasons for 
allowing the evil we see. But, given that God is like a loving parent, it is 
reasonable, assuming OT, to expect that God will somehow communi-
cate to us (i) that despite the fact that we can't discern his reasons for 
allowing the evils we see, there are reasons and (ii) that he still loves and 
cares for us. 
The thing to recognize here is that the problematic consequences of 
divine silence in the face of inscrutable evil are just further instances of 
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inscrutable evil. It is certainly possible that God has a reason not only 
for allowing some inscrutable evil but also for refraining from giving us 
the assurances of his love that O'Connor thinks we should reasonably 
expect. The question we need to ask ourselves is this: If there were God-
justifying reasons for divine silence in the face of inscrutable evils, is it 
reasonable to expect that we would be able to discern what those rea-
sons are? It seems to me that once again we should recognize that we 
have no good reason at all for expecting such discernment on our part. 
Thus, the sensible theistic response to the problem of divine silence is 
simply to point out that it is just another example of inscrutable evil and 
then to appeal to R (the plausibility of which O'Connor has already con-
ceded). 
O'Connor goes on to mention (219-22) two hidden costs of the skepti-
cal theist's position. One is that the skeptical theist will need to be even-
handed in her skepticism. O'Connor's prediction is that this even-hand-
edness will result in "a serious curtailment of traditionally significant 
intellectual dimensions of theism" (220). After all, some access to divine 
intentions is required in order to pursue parts of natural theology, moral 
theology and perhaps even philosophical psychology and anthropology. 
The main thrust of this point can and should be conceded to O'Connor 
with qualification. For the fact that we can't discern God-justifying rea-
sons if he hasH' t revealed them to us doesn't in the least require a skepti-
cism about our ability to discern what God has revealed to us. And 
while one should be even-handed in one's skepticism, it isn't obvious in 
advance exactly what things even-handedness will require one to be 
skeptical about in the other arenas O'Connor mentions. So although 
there may well be limitations to these traditional intellectual pursuits by 
theists, it isn't at all clear that even-handed skepticism will result in a 
"serious curtailment" of them. 
The other cost he mentions is that skeptical theism prevents us from 
calling theism an empirical theory (221). I take the point here to be that 
insofar as one rejects the standard model, one is rejecting theistic eviden-
tialism. But there is a strong and growing tradition in contemporary 
philosophy of religion that aligns itself with what has come to be called 
'Reformed Epistemology'. And one of the main theses of this tradition is 
that we should reject evidentialism (a rejection which, contrary to popu-
lar belief, doesn't require opposition to the goal of finding good theistic 
arguments). So, for many theists, this supposed cost isn't a cost at all. 
And in any case, it's hard to see how it is sensible, in response to this 
supposed cost, to reject R. R seems eminently plausible and if it leads us 
away from evidentialism, so much the worse for evidentialism. 
The final consideration O'Connor mentions as one that makes it ratio-
nal for the atheist to reject the skeptical theist's framework is that the 
standard model has a far better "fit with our initial (strong) intuition 
that those facts of evil for which we can discern no God-justifying reason 
count heavily against OT" (231). But why can't the atheist, in light of the 
extreme plausibility of R, simply recognize that although this intuition is 
strong it is mistaken? After all, the strength of this intuition seems to 
depend almost entirely on the assumption that if there were God-justify-
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ing reasons for the evils we observe, we would be able to discern what 
those reasons are. And that assumption, as tempting as it is for both the-
ists and atheists alike, is mistaken insofar as it conflicts with R. 
In sum, although I applaud O'Connor's forthrightness in recognizing 
the plausibility of R for both the theist and the atheist alike as well as his 
efforts at establishing a detente between theists and atheists writing in 
the philosophy of religion, I don't think he identifies an adequate reason 
for the atheist to reject R. And by failing to do that, he fails to achieve 
one of the goals he sets for himself in part two of the book (that of show-
ing that the atheist can rationally reject the skeptical theist's framework). 
God and Inscrutable Evil is a very important contribution to the current 
discussion of the problem of evil. Despite the fact that I find O'Connor's 
defense (in part two) of the atheist's rejection of the skeptical theist's 
framework unconvincing and that I think the two main arguments in 
part one are fatally flawed, r highly recommend the book. It is eminent-
ly fair, quite comprehensive and, for the most part, very insightful in its 
arguments and criticisms.lO 
NOTES 
1. Seeming NERNP mayor may not be genuine NERNP. 
2. Gratuitous evil is evil the permission of which isn't necessary for 
achieving some greater good or preventing some worse evil. 
3. When O'Connor presents his argument, he speaks only of NERNP, 
not seeming NERNP. But later (e.g. 133), he refers to seeming natural evil 
that is caused with evil intent by free moral agents like Satan as NERNP. So 
we are forced to either (i) redefine NERNP (as "evil that is either natural evil 
resulting from natural processes alone or seeming natural evil that is in fact 
moral evil intentionally caused by nonhuman free moral agents") or (ii) for-
mulate the argument in terms of seeming NERNP. I've chosen the latter 
option since evil intentionally caused by a creature like Satan seems more 
appropriately referred to as moral evil than as natural evil of a certain kind. 
4. See my "Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness 
and Plantinga's Free Will Defense", Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 336-51, 
section 4 where I mention other examples of this sort of confusion. 
5. See The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 188. 
6. See his "Self-Profile", Alvin Plantinga, James Tomberlin and Peter 
van Inwagen, eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 1985), p. 47. 
7. See The Nature of Necessity p. 188 for Plantinga's definition of 
transworld depravity. 
8. Perhaps O'Connor thinks that, according to the standard model, OT 
is committed to identifying some exhaustive list of the goods that provide 
God with reasons for permitting evil (perhaps even a list containing only G). 
But if that's what the standard model entails, then it is relevant only to ver-
sions of OT that hardly anyone endorses - the standard model just isn't 
applicable to discussions of any widely held version of OT. This sort of con-
sideration raises doubts about how standard the standard model is. 
9. There are (as William Rowe reminds me) at least two possible read-
ings of R. On the first reading, 'discern' means discern on our own; on the 
second it means discern on 01lr own or with the aid of divine intervention. In 
what follows, I proceed on the assumption that O'Connor accepts R on both 
BOOK REVIEWS 569 
readings. 1, like O'Connor (as I understand him), think R is extremely plau-
sible on both readings. However, there are those who find R plausible on 
the first reading but not on the second. I don't have the space here to defend 
the plausibility of R on the second reading. Let me just say that to reject R 
on that second reading, it seems one would need a reason to think there is 
no good that (a) includes the permission of all inscrutable evil but doesn't 
include divine intervention of the kind that would make it possible for us to 
discern reasons for the permission of such evils and (b) is greater than any 
other obtainable good that doesn't include such things or other things as 
bad. But we don't have a reason to think there is no good like this. Our 
inability to identify such a good certainly doesn't provide us with such a 
reason. 
10. My thanks to Dan Howard-Snyder, Bill Rowe and Linda Zagzebski 
for their comments on earlier drafts. 
Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. Herdt. 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv and 300. Cloth $59.95 
ELIZABETH RADCLIFFE, Santa Clara University 
Jennifer Herdt's fascinating book is a study of the concept of sympathy 
in Hume's moral philosophy. So why this title? What makes Herdt's 
discussion unique is that she examines this central notion in Hume's 
moral theory in the context of religion and its divisive effect on seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century society. Her thesis is that when Hume's 
moral theory is studied within the tradition of natural law from which it 
is descended, it becomes evident that Hume replaces divine revelation 
in previous moral frameworks with the workings of natural sympathy. 
Generally, the argumentation of this book is historical; that is, Herdt 
defends various claims concerning the philosophical development of 
Hume's moral philosophy by appealing to the ideas and current events 
to which he is reacting. Herdt's interpretation appeals to a breadth of 
Hume's writings, including the critical essays and The History of England. 
Consequently, readers should not come here looking for an analytic 
study of the arguments in Hume's ethics; rather, they should expect an 
interpretation in a broad, historically-informed setting. At the same 
time, Herdt's discussion leads to some interesting claims about the con-
tent of Hume's moral theory that I wil1later address here. 
The purpose of Herdt's plan is clear: She wants to reject the approach 
to Hume that has mainly seen him as concerned with epistemology, and 
substitute for it an interpretation that sees Hume as concerned in his 
work with achieving a social outcome-namely, peace and prosperity. 
Then, she claims, Hume's political essays and the History form a unified 
corpus with his other very famous works (Preface, xiii). Herdt explains 
that her book, to which it is well worth devoting some time, is designed 
to defend eight claims. 
(1) Hume's project is best understood in the context of natural law, 
but it is more radical than the other natural law theorists. They purport 
